I Introduction
Flooding is New Zealand's most frequent natural hazard with climate change likely to increase both the intensity and frequency of major flooding events. 1 On average a major flood occurs every eight months. 2 Compounding the effects, most towns and cities are situated near rivers, increasing flooding's economic impact. This essay explores the extent to which a local authority may be liable in tort for flood damage, addressing both direct liability and so called "nondelegable" duties for the work of contractors. An analysis of whether councils should be liable is undertaken with a brief evaluation of current practices of insuring against loss for both homeowners and local authorities.
This essay concludes that, while local authorities can be liable for flooding in some circumstances, it is preferable for homeowners to purchase private insurance rather than extend local authority liability further than the current state of the law.
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Lynley Bilby "Torrential rain causes slips and power cuts" The New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 20 July 2014). 
II Background

A Statutory Framework: Who Is Responsible for What?
Local government in New Zealand is made up of larger regional councils (RCs), and myriad smaller territorial authorities (TAs) servicing specific communities. Responsibility for managing flood risk is primarily vested in regional councils and territorial authorities -rather than central government -through a plethora of statutes, some over a century old. These statutes provide various tools. The two focused on in this essay are categorised as:
11
(1) hazard controls -for example stopbanks, culverts, and their maintenance; 12 and (2) flood loss insurance.
13
Central government
Central government plays a reduced role, focusing primarily on recovery.
14 However, the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) requires the Minister for the Environment to ensure the Act is effectively implemented. 15 The
Ministry for the Environment is required to provide advice to the government, its agencies, and other public authorities on "the identification and likelihood of natural hazards and reduction of the effects of natural hazards". 16 Despite this general duty to provide information no specific policy group or commission is tasked with guiding local government's approach to flooding. However, commentary indicates that a lack of legislative clarity has made it difficult to determine to whom any given task falls. 22 The boundaries for
RCs are partly determined on the basis of water catchment areas, while TAs are based on community interests. Consequently, RCs have a greater degree of responsibility in respect of flood planning.
Under Schedule 10 of the Local Government Act 2002 (LGA), local authorities are required to produce "long-term plans". Such a plan must be produced in respect of a range of a "group of activities", one such "group" being "flood protection and control works". 23 This plan must detail inter alia how the plan is to be funded. 24 Councils are also required to produce "regional policy statements" (RPSs). 25 These seek to provide direction for resource management. A RPS must state "objectives, policies, and methods" to "avoid or mitigate natural hazards or any group of hazards".
26
Under the RMA regional and district "plans" must "give effect" to the RPS. 27 These "regional plans" may be created to address any major resource management issue.
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Section 25A(1)(a) 20 Section 25.
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Some TAs overlap with more than one of the 11 regions.
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John McSweeny, above n 11, at 6.
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Local Government Act 2002, Schedule 10, cl 2(2)(d).
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Resource Management Act 1991, ss 59-63.
26
Section 62(1)(i).
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Sections 67(3)(c) and 75(3)(c).
The RMA allows RCs to delegate or transfer a function, power, or duty to another "public authority" (including a local council). 28 Authorities must continue to monitor the use of that delegated power.
29
The Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act 1941 (SCRCA) makes provision for "the prevention of damage by erosion" and to provide "protection of property from damage by floods." The Act creates catchment boards and provides them with the power to "minimise and prevent damage within its district by flood erosion", 30 and the power to "construct, reconstruct, alter, repair, and maintain" necessary works. 
Territorial authorities
TAs, like RCs, must ascertain policy and funding priorities in their longterm plans through which the annual plan gives effect. This can be achieved through "district plans", the purpose of which is to "assist territorial authorities to carry out their functions" to achieve the purposes of the RMA. 36 At all times a district plan must be in place, prepared by the TA. continues a nuisance with knowledge of its existence, having failed to take reasonable steps to end it, will be liable for harm caused by that nuisance.
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The fact that the escape was a one-off event was no barrier to recovery.
There has been academic criticism of the blurring of intellectual distinctions between the rule in Rylands v Fletcher (which typically concerns isolated escapes) and nuisance. 63 However, several nuisance cases have succeeded on this basis, 64 the doctrine now well established.
Pemberton v Bright addresses the second issue as to whether council management of drainage works can result in actionable nuisances. 65 The defendant council widened a bridge, and the culvert below it, by 10 metres.
For three decades council workers regularly cleared it of debris. Following particularly heavy rainfall the culvert became blocked and nearby land flooded. The plaintiffs brought an action in nuisance. The Court held that, as the defendants had created a "potential nuisance" which became an actual nuisance when blocked, the council was liable.
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Further supporting isolated escapes from drains as "constituting a nuisance"
Greenock Corporation v Caledonian Rail Co concerned a culvert in a stream. 67 As part of a children's playground a concrete paddling pool and dam were built at the culvert's mouth. These works constituted a major obstruction to the water flow. During high rainfall the stream flooded and damaged the plaintiff's properties. Lord Findlay, in a passage followed by adequate to carry off the water brought down even by extraordinary rainfall … Liability was appropriate because it was a direct result of the obstruction created by the defendants.
The New Zealand courts have followed the UK approach, although no plaintiff has had a notable success against a local authority in respect of flooding. In Atlas Properties several plaintiffs sued a council after a culvert was overwhelmed during a period of exceptional rainfall, the excess spilling out and flooding nearby properties and businesses. 70 Nuisance was claimed but failed. Durie J held that in each of the cases discussed above a particular feature of the works resulted in the water's escape. In Greenock there was a dam and pool, and in Pemberton an unprotected culvert with a propensity to block existed. 71 In Atlas, there had been no interference with the channel of water except for the construction of the culvert itself which, importantly, did not limit the natural flow of water.
The courts will thus hold councils liable for one-off escapes caused by blocked or restricted drains and culverts followisng heavy rain only where the work interferes with the natural flow of water. Furthermore, a council may inherit a nuisance if it continues it with knowledge that it has, or may cause harm, and fails to take reasonable steps to avoid that harm. This applies most appropriately to drains becoming congested.
Once an actionable nuisance has been established the usual remedy restraining the activity is an injunction. 72 In the context of widespread flooding, which is irregular, damages will generally be appropriate. an injunction rather than damages. The provision has been narrowly interpreted. In Atlas Properties, discussed above, the stopbank was intentionally built so that if the culvert was overwhelmed, the excess water would flow over the bank, albeit then flooding the plaintiff's property.
Curiously, Durie J held that there was no "accidental overflow", the overflow being the intentional result of a floodplan, s 148(1) therefore not applying. 82 Nevertheless, even if the section does apply, an action in negligence may be brought.
Negligence
The tort of negligence operates where a defendant has been careless in some legally relevant way. In particular, it has four main elements: (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a 'duty of care'; (2) the defendant breached that duty of care; (3) the harm suffered by the plaintiff was caused by the defendant's breach; and (4) the harm caused was not too 'remote' from the breach.
(a) Duty of care
Whether a duty of care is owed is assessed, firstly, on whether the relationship between the parties is sufficiently "proximate", then analysing "policy" arguments, often external to the parties, either militating against or enforcing a duty. This part addresses arguments of proximity. The policy of council liability will be addressed later. However, when seeking to impose a private duty against a public authority exercising its public functions, the courts have been hesitant to recognise a duty. This issue is commonly referred to as "justiciability" and is relevant to both "proximity" and "policy". Stephen Todd, above n 47, at 147.
It is highly unlikely that issues of justiciability will arise where a local authority chooses to undertake flood protections and then carries them out without reasonable care. For example, if a council decides to provide stopbanks to protect against a 1 in 50 year flood, and a 1 in 100 year flood occurs, damaging the plaintiff's property, the claim would likely not proceed. The plaintiff would have to allege that the council was negligent in its decision to protect only against a lesser flood. On the other hand, if the same decision was made and works were carried out carelessly and a 1 in 25 year flood occurred damaging the plaintiff's property because the stopbank was not built with due care, the harm results from the operation of the decision rather than the decision itself. Consequently a claim will appropriately lie against the authority. This is commonly referred to as the "operational" "policy" distinction, 84 although it is more appropriately a spectrum than a dichotomy. 85 There are two New Zealand cases which exemplify the courts' approach to this type of duty in respect of flooding.
In The Council granted the subdivision requiring earthworks to be undertaken.
Later on permits for construction on the land were granted, again, requiring the Council to be satisfied of the land's security from flooding. On these bases the exercise of statutory powers made the parties sufficiently proximate.
These two cases illustrate different ways of finding that the relevant councils owed a duty of care. In summary, many considerations lead to a council owing a duty. Firstly, most significant building work requires approval by a council after having considered the land's susceptibility to flooding. Secondly, councils levy rates from the public in order to fund flood protection measure. Thirdly, it is reasonably foreseeable that, if a council carelessly undertakes its statutory obligations to protect against flooding, then damage by flooding may occur. These cases illustrate that the courts are willing to impose a duty, and overcome issues of justiciability.
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Yet, whether a duty is owed in any given case will depend on its facts.
(b) Breach, causation, and remoteness
As these enquiries tend to be factual analyses rather than legal, an attempt to canvass the multitude of scenarios in which a local authority may have breached a duty in any given situation is unnecessary. However, the greatest difficulty plaintiffs appear to have in negligence claims of this nature is proving that the authority's breach of its duty caused the damage. 
"Inherently dangerous" activities
The orthodox position has been modified by a recent UK Supreme Court decision, Woodland v Swimming Teacher Association.
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There, the appellant was a student of a local school which provided swimming lessons to students. The school sought an independent contractor to undertake these lessons. At some stage during the lesson, the appellant lost consciousness under water, was resuscitated, but suffered a serious hypoxic brain injury. It was accepted that the school could not be vicariously liable as the swimming instructors were "truly independent contractors". 102 The appellant sought to recover against the school on the basis that it owed her a non-delegable duty of care. The school countered by claiming that, as the instruction was given by an independent contractor, the contractor alone remained liable, not the school.
Lord Sumption, delivering the judgment of the majority, 103 noted two categories of non-delegable duty. 104 The first of these categories (although not relevant to that case), 105 endorsed in New Zealand, 106 operates where the defendant employs a contractor to perform a function which is inherently dangerous. This category is typically reserved for "especially hazardous activities", itself split into the "highway" cases, and the more general "extra hazardous" cases. 107 While some floodworks also constitute roads (culverts under bridges, for example) the highway cases will not be canvassed here as they occupy a very specific place within the "especially hazardous"
category. 108 The more general "extra hazardous" category will be the focus of this part.
Woodland v Swimming Teacher Association, above n 98.
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With whom Lady Hale agreed but wrote a separate judgment. which an assumption of responsibility can be imputed to the defendant.
Thirdly, the plaintiff has no control over how the obligation is performed.
There are some similarities between this type of duty and flooding protection. However, these do not appear to be sufficient to bring the council within the ambit of the doctrine for the purpose of protecting the community at large from flooding. Factors pointing in favour of there being such a duty include the relevant statutory empowerment to undertake flood protection, and provisions in the LGA which state that an authority will remain liable even in the event of delegation. 123 Additionally, protection from floods is difficult, and for individuals to undertake, often impossible.
Consequently, a local authority is far better placed to address the issue.
Furthermore, many populated areas of New Zealand are at a high risk of being flooded. Consequently, there may be said to be a certain 'risk' around this type of work in respect of which it is more appropriate to impose a nondelegable duty.
However, many factors run contrary to such a duty. Firstly, while many who live in flood prone areas may be vulnerable to flooding, they are not "especially vulnerable" in the same sense that a prisoner, patient, or child is vulnerable to risk created by the circumstance of their care arrangements. rather than property damage. 124 Thirdly, there is no "antecedent relationship" such that the council has actual custody over the properties of general homeowners in the same way that a school has custody over children in its care. Consequently, the necessary assumption of a positive duty to protect the plaintiff's property cannot be imputed. 125 Fourthly, a plaintiff, through community consultation, may have a say in how the council goes about performing its flood protection obligations. As Easton Agriculture illustrates, the extraction of rates can bring with it public consultation.
In conclusion, the differences between the line of cases under this category of non-delegable duty and the nature of flood damage (in particular, the focus on the person rather than property) may be an insurmountable hurdle despite legislative indications to the contrary. 126 Consequently, even if the New Zealand courts adopt Woodland, councils under neither category are likely to owe a non-delegable duty to members of the general public for failed flood works.
IV Should Councils be Liable?
Floods will continue to occur. These floods will cause damage and someone will pay for that damage. While, in the right circumstances, a local authority can be liable for flood damage, is it appropriate that they should? In reality, are they covered by other policies such as insurance? Should liability be strict, or merely fault based? This discussion involves three key players:
residents and businesses who suffer harm, councils, and the insurance industry. The 'big picture' issue is whether individual members of the community are to bear the cost themselves (individual liability), or whether councils should protect individuals by distributing that loss through rates (communal/council liability). The author argues that an amalgam of the two models is preferable, while recognising that the distinction may be artificial
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While personal injury may not be an impossible result, property is the focus in New Zealand.
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However, this may be different where a council has condemned a property until a problem (such as flooding) has been remedied, creating a pseudo-physical custody of the property. For example, the red zoning of large areas of property in Christchurch following the Canterbury earthquakes may suffice.
in light of insurance practices and the potentially inhibitive cost of litigation.
An analysis of loss spreading will inevitably require an elucidation of some economic concepts. A brief discussion about current insurance practices is also necessary. Policy arguments below may also be applicable as to whether a duty of care is "fair, just and reasonable" 127 for the purposes of a negligence claim.
A Homeowner and Local Authority Insurance
Homeowners
The primary means of protecting homes and their contents is through private insurance policies. Few home insurance policies exclude flood damage.
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The Earthquake Commission (EQC), a Crown entity, also provides national insurance called EQCover. EQCover insures residential buildings against natural disasters including storms and flooding. EQCover is paid from the Natural Disaster Fund (the Fund) under the Earthquake Commission Act 1993.
EQCover is automatic for those who have private insurance policies for their home and/or contents that includes fire damage. Cover for "storm or flood" damage is more limited than other natural disasters. Claims may be made only in respect of "residential land", 129 not contents.
A Levy included in insurance premiums paid by customers is paid to EQC.
EQCover pays a maximum of $100,000 for damage to "residential buildings", the balance paid by insurance companies under the customer's
policy. An insurance company could seek to recover the balance against a local authority for damage resulting from an authority's negligent safeguard. brought against a local council for flooding. 130 However, insurers potentially can recover costs for loses resulting from the negligence of others.
Councils
Councils insure their own assets against flood damage in a range of ways, for example through the Local Authority Protection Programme Disaster Fund 131 and through private insurance policies. Liability insurance may be purchased in respect of damage caused by the council to private individuals.
B Where Should Loss Fall?
As discussed above, this essay addresses individual and communal/council liability. A system of individual liability would require that councils either be completely immune from actions or be liable only in limited circumstances, for example negligence. 132 Both options would require legislative action. Individuals would be expected to absorb the loss themselves, a majority of whom will have home insurance. As a general rule insurance companies charge more over time in accumulative premiums than
the value of what they pay out, otherwise there would be no market for insurance (leaving aside reinsurance). Consequently the community as a whole will pay more to insurance companies than the total value of losses from flooding, except in extreme events where insurers cannot afford to pay out all claims. 133 Despite this, people are generally risk averse. When faced with the choice between a small certain loss and a higher but uncertain loss of equal value, people prefer the certain outcome. burdened. The average homeowner's most valuable asset, their home and land, may be prohibitively expensive to rebuild. This is a major downfall of individual liability. Additionally, if councils were never liable for damage, they may be less motivated to carefully undertake flood protection.
Individual liability is nevertheless advantageous for a number of reasons, apparent when examining the council liability model. If councils are to be liable they will pass that loss back to the public at large through rates. The income from rates can then be applied in one of two ways. A general fund may be created into which those rates are paid and from which money can be drawn to settle claims against the council. Alternatively it could be used to purchase liability insurance. Regardless of how the money is used, this essay refers to both types of scheme, interchangeably, as a 'rates based' insurance scheme. Therefore where councils have this protection they will be largely unaffected. Nevertheless, if councils were to be liable the price of home insurance in respect of flooding should decrease as insurance companies would be able to pursue claims against councils more readily.
However, home and business owners with private insurance will lose out.
They will not only be paying insurance premiums privately in excess of the value of the overall loss, but will also be funding the council's insurance.
These rates are unlikely to be popular among homeowners who already have insurance, infringing on a homeowner's autonomy to insure how they wish, if at all. In conclusion, the individual liability model would be economically efficient, but may be unduly harsh on those who cannot afford to insure their homes.
C Loss Spreading
Nevertheless, should the council liability model be adopted, a system of loss distribution would have to exist. While there are three specific rating systems, these are beyond the scope of this essay. 135 Instead, three different forms of loss spreading will be discussed: a no-fault ACC-type scheme (not dissimilar to, but going further than EQCover), strict liability, and fault
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See Kenneth Palmer, above n 48, at 481 for a comprehensive discussion on the various rating systems.
based liability. Realistically, the current system is an amalgam of all three. This scheme bears some similarities with EQCover which involves the government remedying damage caused by natural disasters without being concerned whether anyone was at fault for that loss. 140 This could be seen as a property-based parallel to "rehabilitation" under ACC.
However, the differences are significant. EQCover is not indiscriminate.
Only those who have taken out the necessary insurance will receive EQCover pay-outs, unlike ACC which pays out irrespective of insurance.
Furthermore, EQCover will only extend up to a certain dollar value, as Damage by natural disaster in most circumstances will not be anyone's 'fault'. However, this essay has demonstrated that, for example, local authorities can still be liable for such damage in some circumstances. discussed above. Consequently, neither the third nor fourth Woodhouse principles could be said to be met in every pay-out. While the limited coverage will be sufficient in some circumstances, in others it may be grossly inadequate.
Should EQCover be extended to occupy a position analogous to ACC? The answer must be 'no', unless the source of funding is significantly altered.
ACC pays those who suffer injuries, and ACC is in turn funded through a variety of levies. Generally people are levied irrespective of risk.
Because EQCover is funded through a portion of insurance premiums paid by insurance companies, in order to function like ACC EQC would have to draw costs from the homeowners more directly. Alternatively, if EQC required payments from local authorities based on the value of property within their geographical ambit then the authority could then charge rates from homeowners who would benefit from that protection.
Additionally, it may also be important to consider the relevant risk to a homeowner of flooding, although this is less emphasised in the ACC scheme. Those living in flood prone areas, being more likely to benefit from rates-based insurance, ought to pay more than those less likely to suffer flooding damage. Indeed, as was the case in Easton Agriculture, the stopbank was built using funds specifically levied from those at risk of inundation. Rate gathering like this would reflect the pragmatic egalitarianism of the Woodhouse Report, but depart somewhat from ACC's source of funding. 141 A risk based assessment may be more favourably viewed by those at a lesser risk of flooding. Realistically these rates would constitute a compensation scheme rather than a liability model.
A fundamental presupposition of the ACC scheme is that there was a significant problem with the previous system: one's ability to recover was a "lottery" based upon the few occasions where that harm was caused through Chambers J, writing for himself and McGrath J, held that these concerns were overstated. Firstly, while recognising that we do not (or did not at the time) know the figures involved, the loss would not be passed on to ratepayers but instead to the council. 148 That cost would then met through fees charged for inspection, and liability insurance if available, rates being a last resort. While that may be true in respect of building inspection there is no separate source of income available to councils in respect of protecting against floods. However, in Easton Agriculture the council, through targeted rating, gathered funds specifically from land owners who were to benefit from the protection. 149 Nevertheless, the public at large are not directly charged for the building of flood works in the sense that anyone who wishes to have a building constructed must pay for the relevant inspections.
Consequently, the cost of flood protection primarily comes from taxes such as rates, rather than fees charged for the construction of works.
Chambers J also stated that often councils will be sharing the bill of remedying defects with those involved in the construction process, while acknowledging that in "some cases" those other parties may have gone bankrupt or into liquidation. 150 Whether this applies in respect of flood works depends on whether a council outsources work to contractors (who may share liability) or undertakes the work itself (leaving the council solely liable).
A purely fault based liability model would have the disadvantage that claims in the absence of any negligence which would have constituted meritorious claims between private parties under strict liability torts will not be available because they are brought in respect of a public entity. However, in the absence of specific immunity provisions liability in negligence is wholly consistent with the statutory scheme as discussed above.
In conclusion, the individual liability model while more economically efficient may be unduly harsh on those who cannot afford to insure themselves. Alternatively, a council liability model, while resulting in a
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complex chain of cost distributions, would have the benefit of ensuring that more homeowners are protected against loss, but at a greater financial cost to the community, depending on the extent of that liability (i.e. strict or fault based). Council liability would also benefit both the insurance industry and homeowners. Insurance companies would potentially be able to recover, and homeowners would have decreased rates of private insurance. On balance,
which is preferable will turn on whether the moral value of protecting flood prone homeowners against loss outweighs the increased financial burden on the community as a whole. Ultimately, the distinction between the two models is artificial: both homeowners and councils will insure, the total loss being spread across the community in either instance. However, significantly changing the degree to which councils are liable would be for the legislature. The preferable approach is an amalgam of both the individual and council liability models: homeowners, where possible ought to have insurance, but councils should remain liable, at the very least where they have been negligent. Strict liability may, however, be overly onerous on councils during catastrophic flooding events.
IV Conclusion
Flooding is a significant problem in New Zealand. Its cost is surpassed only by the recent Canterbury earthquakes. Councils and communities have a real interest in protecting against flooding as best they can, but some of these measures will eventually fail, either because natural forces exceed the limits of the works, or because of problems with the protections themselves.
This essay demonstrates that councils can be liable for flooding damage in respect of their own torts, but that a non-delegable duty is not owed to general members of the public. This may have the effect that where a property is uninsured and the contractor who did the work leading to the damage is insolvent, the property owner cannot recover. The extent to which councils should be liable ultimately falls to whether the moral obligation of socialising loss outweighs acknowledging individual responsibility to insure one's own assets. In the author's view, while councils should remain liable at least for harm caused by their negligence, it would be more economically effective for individuals to remain responsible for protecting their assets through private insurance policies.
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